The Point of Legal Writing is Precision, Not Mass Appeal

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The Lord’s Prayer is 66 words, the Gettysburg Address is 286 words, and there are 1,322 words in the Declaration of Independence. Yet, government regulations on the sale of cabbage total 26,911 words.
David McIntosh, writing in National Review, October 24, 1995

I have seen variations on the above quote passed around via email and social media for years. The implication, I suppose, is that government regulations are needlessly verbose. According to Snopes.com, the sentiment long predates McIntosh’s article.

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If you don’t think that the government has anything whatsoever to say if someone tries to sneak this into the stream of commerce, please stay away from my kitchen

I generally have the same response whenever I see this posted somewhere, although usually the person posting the quote has no interest in actually learning more about why our laws tend to be wordy. The Lord’s Prayer, Gettysburg Address, and Declaration of Independence all had very specific subjects and objectives; briefly stated, a recommendation on how to pray, motivation in wartime, and grounds for independence from England. History has generally deemed the number of words used in each of these writings sufficient to achieve these aims, but it is always possible to say the same thing with more or fewer words. In the event of a listeria outbreak in the nation’s cabbage supply, none of these writings will be of any assistance whatsoever (unless you believe that a few “Our Father”s will be enough to protect the public, in which case I sincerely hope you do not have a high-level position in a health department.) These documents, not to mention the number of words used in each of them, is completely, totally, utterly irrelevant to the nation’s cabbage supply. It is possible that regulations pertaining to cabbage are too wordy, but this comparison does not even come close to making that case. It’s just a less-clever-than-it-thinks attempt to rail against big guv’mint. If you don’t know much of anything about public safety regulations and/or have no desire to understand them, you might find the comparison compelling.

I bring this up because of a broader tendency among people who do not know much about law or legislation to lament the inscrutability of legal writing, arguing that it should be written in a way that nearly anyone could understand. Scott Greenfield, in a post with the ridiculously awesome title “The Fallacy of Simplicity,” annihilates this argument (go read his post. I’ll wait.) Continue reading


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Drinking, Driving, and DAs: The Lehmberg Story Has Gotten Too Interesting for Austin’s Good (UPDATED)

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From “Remove Rosemary Lehmberg” on Facebook

The Travis County legal community is choosing sides in the battle over whether our currently-incarcerated district attorney, Rosemary Lehmberg, should get to keep her job when she gets out of jail in a few weeks. She is currently serving a 45-day sentence for driving while intoxicated, which could be as short as 22-23 days if she manages to stay out of trouble while in there. A Travis County lawyer (also a colleague, law school classmate, and friend) filed a petition to remove her from office, citing a Texas statute allowing removal of a district attorney for intoxication. The County Attorney’s office has now filed suit under that statute to seek Lehmberg’s removal, and a group of Austin attorneys has filed a “Friends of Rosemary” memorandum opposing her removal.

My first thought upon hearing about the memorandum in Lehmberg’s support was a sense that, as a non-practicing but still-licensed attorney, I am somewhat on the sidelines of this debacle. The district attorney is elected by all the voters of Travis County, though, not just the attorneys who vote (even if the attorneys are usually the only ones who closely follow DA and judicial elections.) This affects me and every other individual in this county, even if I will never professionally deal with Lehmberg or her office. I understand the arguments in favor of Lehmberg remaining in office. Considering all of the factors at play, I’m not entirely happy to say this, but I agree that she should go. I think it would be better for her to resign, but the chess pieces are in place now, so I guess we’ll see what happens.

To be clear, I have one reason for this position: public safety. I do not care if the district attorney was drinking alcohol per se. I do not care what a public servant does in their private time, except when it directly threatens the safety of others. Driving while (apparently, very) intoxicated is a direct threat to public safety. The end (of my position statement.)

Here is a bit of a play-by-play of what has happened so far.

I. THE ARREST

According to a police affidavit, as reported by KXAN, a 911 call at about 10:45 p.m. on Friday, April 12, 2013 reported that a Lexus had been driving in the bike lane and weaving for about a mile on southbound FM 620 in west Austin. Police arrested the driver, DA Rosemary Lehmberg. Her behavior at the police station is sure to be the stuff of legend (the affidavit reportedly described her as “both polite and excited, insulting and cocky.”) (Also, restraints were involved.) She was released on a personal bond at about 7:30 that Saturday morning. Continue reading


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In the Battle of States’ Rights Versus Poop, Poop Won

772355_38434700Yes, the U.S. Supreme Court once considered the question of whether a state government could prohibit the importation of solid or liquid waste from across state lines, and concluded that no, it cannot. (I may have exaggerated a little in my title when I implied that the case was just about “poop,” but you’re reading now, aren’t you?) I came across this fun decision during a work-related Googling. It is amazing the things you find.

Anyway, Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), caught my eye, because why would the city of Philadelphia be suing the state of New Jersey? In the 1970′s of all times? It turns out that New Jersey had a law that “prohibit[ed] the importation of most solid of liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State…” Id. at 618. Quite a few private landfills in New Jersey and cities outside of New Jersey had business arrangements, in which those cities shipped their trash to New Jersey. I’m lazy, so just make your own New Jersey jokes here. I’ll wait.

Those private landfills and non-Jersey cities were not too happy. The landfills didn’t like losing business, and the cities didn’t like not being able to ship their effluvia to New Jersey (I’m paraphrasing Justice Stewart’s recitation of the facts, but I imagine the mayor of Philadelphia raging about not understanding the point of being so close to New Jersey if you can’t dump your crap there. Al Pacino is playing the role of the mayor in my imagination. It’s some awesome scenery-chewing.) So they sued the state of New Jersey for violating the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

Typically, when you hear the term “states’ rights,” you either think of segregation or the Tenth Amendment. More jurisprudence related to what states can and cannot do, or what the federal government can or cannot make states do, derives from the Commerce Clause and other provisions nearby. In this situation, rather than a federal government that, depending on how you look at it, was either the source of or the last bastion against tyranny, private businesses were suing their own state, and municipal governments were suing a foreign (i.e. different) state. It doesn’t quite fit the standard “states’ rights” rhetorical model, but it does bring up a good question: does a state government, ostensibly of, by, and for its people, have the right to keep other people’s garbage out?

Short answer, no. If you’ve read this far but would really rather be off elsewhere eating a Hot Pocket, you may go now. Continue reading


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My 15 Minutes of Animal Law Fame

I was part of a panel at the State Bar of Texas 2013 Animal Law Institute at South Texas College of Law on March 22, 2013. It is very similar to the presentation I did in Austin in September 2011, if you have been following my CLE presentation career. Anyway, here it is:


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Today in Good Lawyering

A school shooter faced sentencing this week for a 2012 shooting in Chardon, Ohio. He received a life sentence. It probably did not help that he wore a t-shirt with the word “killer” written on the front in black marker. The point I want to make is the heroic effort apparently shown by his lawyer to keep the kid from further damaging his own case.

Going against the recommendation of his counsel, Lane addressed the courtroom before learning his fate. He smiled periodically and showed little remorse for his actions.

“F— all of you,” he said, before raising his middle finger at the victims’ families, according to the Plain Dealer. (Emphasis added)

One of the first lessons I learned as a lawyer was “You can’t save your clients from themselves.” I salute this kid’s lawyer for trying.

This kid probably has some pretty serious psychiatric issues, and I hope that they get addressed. I’m not holding my breath for that.

(h/t TEGS, Samuel Warde)


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A Murder of C Corps

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERAWednesday morning hypothetical:

  1. Corporations are “persons,” according to the U.S. Supreme Court and various political and media figures.
  2. Corporations (and other artificial business entities) have certain rights under the Constitution, a matter upon which the major disagreement is the extent and breadth of said protections.
  3. Corporations operating in a market economy seek advantages and dominant positions over competitors, with the aim of maximizing profits.
  4. Corporations sometimes embark on campaigns to improve their own products, services, or value to customer; lower prices; or gain other advantages in local, regional, national, and transnational markets. The effect of such campaigns is, at times, the bankruptcy or closure of rival businesses.
  5. In some cases described in #4, the rival business ceases to exist.
  6. Businesses may intend to drive a competitor out of business, but at a minimum, they embark on business campaigns with the knowledge that closure of a rival business is likely to result.
  7. In jurisdictions that define murder as intentionally causing the death of another person, is a business in this situation guilty of murder? In jurisdictions that define manslaughter as knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causing the death of another person, would that statute apply?

Just a thought I had. Texas defines criminal homicide (murder and manslaughter) as involving the death of an “individual,” and defines “individual” as a “human being,” Tex. Pen. Code §§ 19.01(a), 1.07(a)(26), so corporations here are probably safe. I can’t speak for other states, though. Discuss.

Photo credit: jlpeterson from morguefile.com


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My Right Not to Get Shot

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So, uh, this happened…

I alluded to this earlier, but it merits its own discussion: I am standing up for my right to not get shot. Sure, it is not expressly stated in the Bill of Rights that I have a right not to be the unwitting victim of someone who forgot to clear his chamber before carrying his gun in public, but I shall posit that I have the right nonetheless. Call it a penumbra right, or one of the rights guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment that the Supreme Court is too lazy to address.

Consider this: no one, to my knowledge, has ever successfully challenged a conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm on Second Amendment grounds. Laws prohibiting homicide, several centuries of jurisprudence would suggest, trump any individual’s right to bear arms (whether you can keep your gun after a criminal conviction is a different question, and has been subject to much legal wrangling.) See, no one is seriously threatening to come and take your guns. It is both unconstitutional and ridiculously impractical. The NRA says that to get you to buy more guns. It’s not a conspiracy, because it’s really obvious what the NRA is doing.

Moving on to individual discussion about guns, if your first response to any critical commentary on guns is to loudly assert your Second Amendment rights, you sound like a jackass, and I no longer feel constrained by politeness to refrain from telling you that you sound like a jackass. I’m not saying you can’t own guns. I’m not even necessarily saying that you can’t carry your gun around. What I am saying is that you have no right to expect me to assume, on sight, that you are one of those “law-abiding” gun owners. Continue reading


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Beware the Vampire Cops

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“Good evening, Officer The Impaler. May I call you Vlad?”

Police may soon have the authority to draw blood from you, even without your consent or a warrant, if they suspect you of driving while intoxicated. That was the argument, in its most basic form, put forth by the state of Missouri to the U.S. Supreme Court this week in Missouri v. McNeely, No. 11-1425.

The case involves a man pulled over for an alleged traffic offense, then arrested for suspected DWI when the officer noticed the “tell-tale signs” of drunkenness and the smell of booze. The man refused both breath and blood tests after reportedly flunking the field-sobriety test. The officer, who claimed in court that he read an article saying cops no longer needed warrants to draw blood (I did not make that up. Missouri v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. 2012) (“He testified that the article asserted officers no longer needed to obtain a warrant before requiring DWI suspects to submit to nonconsensual blood tests…”)), drove the man to a hospital and instructed a phlebotomist to draw blood. The blood test revealed a blood alcohol content of…….actually, we don’t need to know what it revealed, because Mr. McNeely moved the trial court to suppress the blood test results as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and the court did so.

Without the blood evidence, the prosecution had no case. Unlike Law and Order, where they start shaking down other witnesses until they can make a case again, the prosecutors here appealed the order to the Missouri Supreme Court, which also said no. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), which carved out a narrow exception in the case of a drunk-driving suspect who was injured in a car accident. Because of the time required to transport the guy to the hospital, along with the limited amount of time alcohol stayed in the body, the police in that case were justified in drawing blood without a warrant because (a) time was of the essence, and (b) the guy was already in a hospital bed.

Missouri prosecutors, with the federal government’s support, have now taken this to the high court. They are essentially asking the court to apply the holding of Schmerber to any DWI investigation. In other words, they claim that the fact that the human body metabolizes alcohol, by itself, should constitute exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood test. A blood test, by the way, that involves sticking a hypodermic needle into a vein in your arm and drawing a vial of precious bodily fluids.

I happen to personally think that people who drive while intoxicated need a severe ass beating. I have physically obstructed people I knew to be drunk from going anywhere near their vehicles, and I have hidden keys from people. I have never sucker-punched a drunk person to distract them from trying to get to their car, but I have certainly considered doing so (the person in question, even eight sheets to the wind, would have kicked my ass.)

That said, I find the precedent of allowing cops to collect blood without a warrant, regardless of the circumstances, very troubling. I already think that “no refusal” weekends (which are actually no different from any other weekend) are bumping up against constitutional limits.

At any rate, don’t drive drunk. If you do, I might work up the nerve to sucker-punch you.

Photo credit: by Curious Expeditions on Flickr.


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A PR Firm by Any Other Name Would Not Smell as Sweet

Somehow, the theft of Rory’s name was as unforgivable as stealing his skin; or so her grief told her. A skin was nothing. Pigs had skins; snakes had skins. They were knitted of dead cells, shed and grown and shed again. But a name? That was a spell, which summoned memories. She would not let Frank usurp it.
— Clive Barker, The Hellbound Heart, page 156, Harper Fiction, 1986

507068_88733155Names have a peculiar sort of power. They convey not only basic identity, but a whole range of associations. Our names identify us as individuals, but also demonstrate our family relationships and the level of formality we expect from others. Names evoke not only the concept of a person, but memories of that person, thoughts, and emotions. In business, a name can become a brand, something that has economic value in its own right. Our names represent us as four-dimensional beings, identifying who we are, who we have been, and who we may yet be. One’s name may very well be one’s most precious asset.

Unless, of course, you sign away the rights to your own name.

That’s what Brian Tierney allegedly did when he sold Tierney Communications in 1998, according to the aptly-named lawsuit Tierney v. Tierney, filed in a Philadelphia court in November 2012. The lawsuit, brought by Tierney Communications’ owner, Interpublic Group of Companies, alleges that Tierney’s new business, Brian Communications Group, misuses Tierney’s own name in a way that creates confusion. The new company allegedly uses the phrase “A Brian Tierney Company” in its marketing, which Intergroup doesn’t much like.

As odd as it may seem to lack the right to use your own name, if that’s what Brian Tierney signed, then that’s how it is. According to philly.com, the contract stated that he threw in the rights to use his name in connection with a public-relations or similar business “in consideration of the considerable monies paid to him.” So, you know, they paid for it. Freedom of contract and all that.

This was a plot point, actually, on the third-season finale of Treme, where chef Janette Desautel hosts a charity event using her own name, which happens to also be the name of the restaurant she co-owns with a douchey businessman. Her business partner is furious that she used a banner with a modification of the restaurant’s name, and reminds her that he owns the right to use the name (her name) with or without her. This is why you read the fine print, kids.

(h/t to Antonin Pribetic for bringing the story to my attention)

Photo credit: “Badge” by Gastonmag on stock.xchng.


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The Law Does Not Prohibit All Forms of Douchery

20121224-093757.jpgI sincerely hope that, when Dr. James Knight, DDS returns to work after the holidays and tells his patients to “spit,” at least a few of them aim for his face. Dr. Knight, as you may have heard, is the Iowa dentist who fired his assistant in 2010 for being “irresistible.” The Iowa Supreme Court ruled last Friday that the firing, while certainly “unfair” to the employee, did not violate state anti-discrimination law. What drives me crazy is that I can’t fault the court’s legal analysis. The entire opinion in Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C. is online, and it’s only 16 pages. Go read it for yourself.

The shortened version of the story is that, after nearly ten years working with her, Dr. Knight began to inform his dental assistant, Melissa Nelson, that he considered her workplace attire inappropriate. Specifically, her clothes were either too revealing or too tight, although Nelson denied dressing inappropriately for a Midwestern dental practice. In mid-2009, he began a platonic text message correspondence with Nelson, who said that she viewed Knight as a “friend and father figure.” In late 2009, Mrs. Knight, who also worked at the dental practice, discovered the correspondence. Concerned over how this would affect their marriage, they decided, in consultation with their pastor, to fire Nelson.

Nelson sued Knight and his dental practice for gender discrimination under state law. She did not claim sexual harassment, and stated that her communications with Knight never made her uncomfortable, despite this:

Nelson, 32, worked for Knight for 10 years, and he considered her a stellar worker. But in the final months of her employment, he complained that her tight clothing was distracting, once telling her that if his pants were bulging that was a sign her clothes were too revealing, according to the opinion.

He also once allegedly remarked about her infrequent sex life by saying, “that’s like having a Lamborghini in the garage and never driving it.”

Ew.

The central question is whether Knight fired his dental assistant of ten years primarily because of her gender. As Katy Waldman notes at Slate, this case affirms that an employer can fire an employee for any number of nutty reasons:

[Y]ielding to an employer’s irrational preferences—so long as they aren’t explicitly rooted in race, color, religion, sex or national origin—comes with the territory of office work. You can get canned because your laugh grates on your boss’s nerves. Or because he or she misinterpreted something you said. Or, yes, because he or she finds you attractive and would rather not deal.

The court’s conclusion was that Knight’s main motivation was not gender bias, but rather concern for his marriage. As tempting as it is to throw one’s briefcase in the air and scream “This whole trial is out of order!!!!!!” (I haven’t practiced law in a little while, but I’m pretty sure you still can’t actually do this), the court actually has legal precedent behind it, more or less. It relied on Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F. 3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006), where the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “‘sexual favoritism,’ where one employee was treated more favorably than members of the opposite sex because of a consensual relationship with the boss,” does not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. If it is not discrimination to treat an employee more favorably under those circumstances, the court seems to be saying, it is also not discrimination to treat an employee less favorably.

Both the court and Dr. Knight acknowledged that Nelson did nothing wrong. That’s what is so infuriating about the decision, because it put Nelson’s employment at the mercy of Knight’s libido and Mrs. Knight’s tolerance for jealousy. It is worth noting that the Knights made the decision to fire Nelson in consultation with their pastor, who agreed that firing her was the best way to go. I’m not going to bother trying to identify their church, but I do hope that the people in Knight’s community make their feelings known.

20121224-094916.jpgNelson argues that she would not have been fired if she weren’t a woman. With the information at hand, though, we don’t really know that. Who is to say that Dr. Knight’s wife would not have felt similarly threatened by an attractive young male assistant? (Picture Kellan Lutz, then try to get any work done.) That’s probably not the argument Knight’s attorneys were trying to make, but like I said, we don’t know that.

The bottom line of this case is that lawful acts are not always right, and that our legal system cannot always mediate between right and wrong. It may be possible to modify the law to allow the possibility of legal redress for the more overtly douchey scenarios like this, but for the time being, this is a case that fell through the cracks of anti-discrimination law. My concern is that an employer might justify otherwise unlawful firings by claiming flirtation. It would take a uniquely douchey boss to do that, but they aren’t exactly in short supply.

Photo credit: ‘Girls dressed up as nurses’ by Szater (Own work) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons; ‘Kellan Lutz, 2012′ by Joella Marano, uploade by MyCanon (Kellan Lutz) [CC BY-SA 2.0], via Wikimedia Commons.


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