Points for Effort, I Guess

Here’s an example of what, to a lawyer, ought to be a patently ridiculous argument, but that also deserves a certain grudging respect for its sheer audacity. This is from a 2009 unpublished decision by the Texas First District Court of Appeals in Houston, Bradley v. Texas:

Appellant, Marcus Andre Bradley, challenges the order of the county court at law denying him the relief that he requested in his application for a writ of habeas corpus. In his sole issue, appellant contends that the State’s prosecution of him for the offense of cruelty to animals, after a justice court had, in a prior proceeding, terminated his ownership of 45 pit bull dogs and ordered him to pay $9,020 to the Houston Humane Society for the boarding and care of the dogs, is barred under the “doctrine[s] of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel.”

We affirm the order of the trial court.

It’s mostly the double jeopardy argument that intrigues me. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution says that a person cannot be tried twice for the same offense, but it’s not as simple as it might sound. The government can’t charge you with the same offense if you are acquitted after a trial, or if the case is declared a mistrial after a certain point in the case. That doesn’t apply, though, if one case is criminal and the other isn’t. Continue reading

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Texas Court Clarifies How to Appeal a “Dangerous Dog” Ruling

The law governing “dangerous dogs” is not as well-defined as it should be, with jurisdiction often split between municipal and county courts. Procedures may vary widely from one municipality or county to another, including between a municipality and the county in which it is located. In an attempt to be brief, if a dog bites or otherwise attacks someone, the local animal control authority may take possession of the dog, and a judge must make a determination as to whether the dog meets certain criteria to be declared “dangerous” (a statutorily-defined term.) The law mandates various requirements on the owner of a “dangerous” dog, including maintaining extra insurance and keeping the dog in an approved enclosure. If the court finds that the dog caused the death of, or serious bodily injury to, a person, it can order the dog destroyed.

Chapter 822 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, which covers regulation of non-livestock domestic animals (e.g. dogs, cats, etc.) does not provide specifics about appealing a municipal or county court’s determination that a dog is “dangerous”

In Romano v. Texas, a woman fostering a dog for a rescue group was bitten (the court says “attacked,” but I’m assuming one or more bites were involved) by the dog, an a Montgomery County justice of the peace ruled that the dog caused “serious bodily injury” and was to be destroyed pursuant to § 822.003(e) of the Health and Safety Code. The rescue group appealed to the county court, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, albeit without any findings of fact or conclusions of law. The group then appealed that dismissal to the 9th District Court of Appeals. Continue reading

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My 15 Minutes of Animal Law Fame

I was part of a panel at the State Bar of Texas 2013 Animal Law Institute at South Texas College of Law on March 22, 2013. It is very similar to the presentation I did in Austin in September 2011, if you have been following my CLE presentation career. Anyway, here it is:

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