In case you were worried about all those religious exemption cases (e.g. Hobby Lobby, etc.) creating some sort of slippery slope towards justifying all sorts of otherwise-unlawful acts in the name of sincere religious beliefs, you might be on to something: convicted (and admitted) murderer Scott Roeder wants his murder conviction reduced to voluntary manslaughter because, basically, of his religious beliefs.
Almost five years ago, the life of a man – a physician and father of four widely regarded as kind, compassionate, and dedicated to his patients – was abruptly ended. On a Sunday in late May of 2009, while Dr. George Tiller handed out flyers at his church in Wichita, Kansas, he was shot in the head at point blank range by Scott Roeder. What had Dr. Tiller done wrong? He was a doctor who provided legal, constitutionally protected medical care to women. But all Scott Roeder saw was an abortion provider, and Scott Roeder believes that abortion is wrong.
So he killed him.
Roeder has already been convicted of first-degree murder. But today the Kansas Supreme Court will hear further arguments about Roeder’s crime. Though he fully admits to killing Dr. Tiller, Roeder appealed his conviction, and is asserting that he should be guilty only of voluntary manslaughter. In Kansas, voluntary manslaughter, an “imperfect self-defense,” allows a defendant to argue that he truly believed in the moment that he was justified in using deadly force. In this case, that means that Roeder is asking for a lesser sentence for killing Dr. Tiller because Roeder truly believes that abortion is wrong. As my colleagues have written before, Roeder is asking the court to conclude that “vigilantism is okay if you really mean it.”
Under Kansas law, “voluntary manslaughter” is defined in part as:
knowingly killing a human being committed…upon an unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances existed that justified use of deadly force under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5222 [“defense of a person; no duty to retreat”], 21-5223 [“defense of dwelling, place of work or occupied vehicle; no duty to retreat”] or 21-5225 [“defense of property other than a dwelling, place of work or occupied vehicle”], and amendments thereto.
Each of the three statutes cited in the definition of voluntary manslaughter requires “reasonabl[e] belie[f] that such use of force is necessary.” Roeder could still spend a long time in prison, mind you, but he is asking the Kansas legal system to declare that he is not a murderer because of his sincerely-held, albeit unreasonable, beliefs about abortion.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments this month in McCullen v. Coakley about the constitutionality of buffer zones around clinics that provide abortion services, requiring protesters to stay at least thirty-five feet away. The general reason for the buffer zones is the safety of the people going into the clinics. Some people might believe that those protesters potentially pose a threat to people seeking medical care that is 100% legal and constitutional. There’s probably no good way of knowing who among these protesters might pose a legitimate threat to the safety of these people. Do you see where I’m going with this? Someone who decided to take a bit of preemptive action against a protester (i.e. by killing them) would, legally speaking, be a murderer—unless Scott Roeder sets a new precedent, perhaps.
The Kansas Supreme Court held, more than two decades ago, that a necessity defense did not apply in a case against an abortion protester charged with criminal trespass at the Wichita Family Planning Clinic, and it noted the absurdity of the type of claim Roeder is making now: “If every person were to act upon his or her personal beliefs in this manner, and we were to sanction the act, the result would be utter chaos.” City of Wichita v. Tilson, 253 Kan. 285, 296 (1993), quoting Comm. v. Wall, 372 Pa. Superior Ct. 534, 543 (1988).
If Roeder’s argument works, we don’t have to worry about a slippery slope. We have to worry about legal precedent.
Photo credit: Murder in the House by Jakub Schikaneder [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons.